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Abstract: Electoral campaigns in Europe exist on two distinct levels, the traditional national 
level and the newer supranational European level.  Do voters view these two distinct levels as 
independent actors or do their opinions of one level influence their views of the other?  The pre-
existing “democracy deficit” in the European Union seems to have been exacerbated by the 
fallout of the financial crisis and subsequent sovereign debt crises and endless rounds of 
austerity.  The unpopularity of these savage austerity measures seemingly imposed by distant, 
faceless and unaccountable institutions, it is said, is leading to extreme fringe parties gaining 
mainstream acceptance in European political systems, endangering the European democracy and 
the world economy. This paper uses Eurobarometer public opinion surveys in member countries 
to measure citizens’ levels of trust in their national government, as well as trust in European 
Union institutions.  Data before and after the financial crisis is available, providing an 
opportunity to study public reactions over an extended period of time. The descriptive analysis 
suggests that in addition to a very real democracy deficit in “old” Europe (the West and South) 
an institutional deficit exists in the former Communist bloc nations; wherein their citizens’ trust 
level in Europe is unrelated to trust levels in their national government. They trust the 
supranational EU more than their own governments, giving a new wrinkle to research of 
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 It is estimated that between 75 and 100 million people died in both World War I and 
World War II.  Reeling from these catastrophic wars, and with the daunting task of rebuilding a 
devastated Europe now under a perceived Communist threat, post-war French Prime Minister 
Robert Schuman proposed a radical plan to end the historic animosity between France and 
Germany that had led to so much destruction. Schuman’s 1950 proposal, strongly supported by 
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, was for the merger of coal and steel production into 
a single unified management structure. Schuman’s vision was for this joint venture to launch an 
historic process leading to a peaceful and prosperous United States of Europe. Schuman believed 
having collective control of these resources of war (steel and coal) would be the initial building 
block in making the historic warring states of Europe economically dependent on each other. 
This would, he hoped, greatly reduce the chance of yet another devastating war.  The Schuman 
Declaration started Europe on the path toward what would become the European Union.  By 
1951, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg joined their coal 
and steel industries into one, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  By 1957 the 
ECSC had evolved into the European Community (EC), encompassing such areas as agriculture, 
free flow of labor across borders and a common open market among its members.  By the early 
1990s, the EC become the European Union (EU), which as of 2015 encompasses 28 countries
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(see Image 1 below), including several former Communist bloc nations. In addition, the EU 
houses the Eurozone, 19 states that share a common currency (the euro, see Image 2 below)
2
. 
                                                          
1
 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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 Austria, Belgium, Rep. of Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Rep. of Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain are the EU member-states who 





The EU consists of several transnational institutions, most notably the European Commission 
(the bureaucracy), the European Council (the heads of government of each member state) and the 
European Parliament, the only body directly elected. Finally, 26 nations (including some who are 
not members of the EU or the Eurozone) are members of the Schengen zone, wherein a citizen of 
one nation may move freely between all members of the Schengen area, allowing for the free 
flow of people, labor and capital (see Image 3 below)
 3
. 
 Following the Cold War the European Community began a project of greater integration 
between its member states as well as plans to expand into Central and Eastern Europe.  The new 
European Union was born and a great experiment of integration amongst sovereign nation-states 
that blurred traditional notions of sovereignty began. This European attempt at “an ever closer 
union” (Treaty of Rome) involved economic, political and cultural integration eroding borders 
and reducing traditional notions of sovereignty (Dinan, 2005).  For the purpose of this study, 
integration will be defined as “a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences 
of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities” (Al-Rodhan & 
Stoudmann, 2006). To put is more simply integration is “the borderless world” (Ohmae, 1992); 
or in this case a borderless Europe. 
 Frequently the stages of European integration were pushed forward via treaties between 
the representatives of member states with little input or accountability to the wishes of the 
citizens of these member states. As the writ of European institutions widened from esoteric 
concerns to affecting the lives of the average citizen, Europeans became aware of a growing 
“democracy deficit” in their European experiment. The term democracy deficit is credited to 
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David Marquand (1979) to mean the lack of accountability of European institutions toward the 
European public and the subsequent promulgation of sometimes unpopular policies against the 
wishes of the electorate and/or national governments legally bound to implement these decisions 
(Marquand, 1979). This disconnect between European institutions and the national electorate 
may lead to strong and growing dissatisfaction with the European institutions.  Many see a 
powerful, transnational bureaucracy with little accountability encroaching on their nation’s 
independence and sovereignty. 
 A great deal of academic and non-academic writing has been done examining the causes 
and effects of the democratic deficit, especially as the financial and sovereign debt crises have 
ripped through the continent, challenging government and non-government elites (Hartleb, 
2012). Much less examined is the state of deficits in the former Communist bloc nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Common wisdom in contemporary European political discourse 
focuses on the democratic deficit as it is in Western Europe, with little thought seemingly given 
to whether the same conventions hold in the newer EU nations in the East.  In fact, as this study 
will show, a deficit does exist, but of a different variety.  In much of Central and Eastern Europe 
the European Union has historically been, and remains, more popular than their national 
governments.  Even through austerity and the lean times of the last few years, trust in the EU 
remains relatively consistent and stronger than trust in their local, democratically elected, 
governments.  This institutional deficit shows the differences in “new” Europe and “old” Europe, 








Image 1: European Union as of 2015 
 
 The financial troubles of the last few years show vividly the strengths and weaknesses of 
European Union institutions and their new linkages within traditional domestic politics.  In 2007-
08 the great recession began in the United States with the collapse of the housing market and 
brokerage firms like Lehman Brothers and quickly spread throughout the complex, 
interconnected globalized economy.  In Europe the recession hit hard, especially in the 
Eurozone.  In many countries unemployment hit double figures, with youth unemployment 
extremely high (over 50 percent in Spain, according to the European Union’s statistics).  
Governments, European Union institutions, the World Bank, the IMF and the stronger European 
economies (like Germany) reacted by following current conventional economic theory and 





further harm in growth and employment numbers (Lane, 2012). A number of these policies 
seemingly hurt average citizens and were appeared to some imposed by foreign entities like the 
European Central Bank or Germany.  Mainstream political parties of both left and right largely 
supported these measures, leaving opposition to these deeply unpopular policies to political 
parties traditionally outside the mainstream. The democratic deficit coupled with highly 
unpopular economic policies and the recession led to a perceived sharp rise in Euro-skepticism 
that opposed further integration, and sometimes advocated dismemberment of the EU itself 
(Hartleb, 2012).  In addition, extreme anti-immigrant parties like Jobbik in Hungary have seen 
their electoral prospects improve as Europe struggles to come to grips with its various economic 
crises.  European integration has connected Europe in deep and important ways, making 
backtracking on integration a potentially massively destabilizing phenomenon, potentially paving 
the way for political leaders with radically different ideologies and goals. This study will 
examine the effects of the globalized EU’s policies on today’s 28 member European Union. It 
will view public perceptions of national and pan-European governments as signs of acceptance 













Image 2: The Eurozone 
 
 Previous scholarly work in this realm has examined the perceptions of the European 
citizenry toward their individual national governments and toward European Union institutions, 
especially in the realm of European and national elections. For instance, Adam’s examination of 
political party campaigns and their use (or non-use) of European issues in national elections. Reif 
and Schmitt, Mair, Clark and Rohrschneider, Hix and others spend time examining first and 
second order elections. Reif and Schmitt presented the concept of first and second order elections 
in 1980. A first order election is an important national election, such as a parliamentary or 
presidential election. A second order election would be a smaller, less important election, such as 
to the European Parliament and would have less salience with the public and thus less 





Particularly germane to this study is the question of whether or not perceptions of one’s 
national government are influenced by perceptions of the European Union, or vice versa.  Two 
dominant theories are debated within the literature on European elections: transfer theory and sui 
generis theory. Transfer theory states that citizens’ views are shaped by their perception of their 
own national government.  Since European matters are second order, first order concerns 
influence perceptions.  Transfer theorists note European issues have rarely been reflected in 
national political campaigns and elections for the European Parliament traditionally have much 
lower voter turnout, showing a lack of salience for European issues in national politics. 
Mainstream parties rarely discuss European issues with their electorates (Mair, 2000). To put it 
another way, there is less public engagement in a second order election (such as for the European 
Parliament), therefore public perception and voting habits may be influenced by domestic, 
national factors. Europe remains a secondary to more local affairs and is a second order election 
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980). 
Contrasting this is sui generis theory, which simply means voters look at both national 
and European institutions separately and judge them separately. Europe is then a first order 
concern. This theory has been gaining in popularity as European Union institutions and the 
financial crisis have increased the power and presence of European-level structures to the 
average citizen (Clark, 2009). This study expands on this research by examining actual public 
perceptions of national governments and European institutions to try and identify whether 
Europeans just view EU structures through a national lens (transfer theory) or separately (sui 
generis). There is a growing awareness of European governmental power amongst citizens, even 
if the picture is still muddled. This awareness allows Europe to be judged separately (de Vries, 





elections. This study will test theories on a broader scale in an attempt to identify how Europeans 
view their various national and transnational governments in relation to each other to try and 
ascertain any possible correlations. It is hoped this will enlighten as to where and how. 
Image 3: Schengen Area 
 
The general puzzle is how Europeans view their national and European institutions in 
light of the democratic deficit and in the wake of the financial crisis.  It is possible to measure 
public perceptions going back decades due to the availability of Eurobarometer data.  The 
European Commission (the administrative body of the EU) makes available survey data of all 
citizens from polls conducted biannually.  Surveys date back to the 1970s, making it possible to 
measure a country’s responses over time.  This study will begin in 2004 which coincides with the 
accession to the EU of several former communist bloc states; members with decidedly different 





study looks at two salient questions in member states: 1) do citizens tend to trust their national 
government; and 2) do citizens tend to trust the EU as a whole. The descriptive data may shed 
some extra light on to how Europeans view their institutions, what may be influencing these 
views and possible nuances overlooked elsewhere. 
 This paper will examine the considerable literature on the European Union, integration 
and theories proposed and debated. The results from these surveys are compared with previous 
theories and hypotheses. Then the analysis adopts a mix of comparative case study and 
descriptive statistics to test a hypothesis relating to public trust in national governments and EU 
institutions. The paper concludes with the implication of the results and possible generalizations. 
Using these methods we will see the answer is highly complex and not prone to simple, bilateral 
narratives. Some member nations will show a large gap between their levels of trust in their 














 In European scholarship, the democratic deficit has long-been studied and was first 
identified in 1979, when the EU was still a loose collection in Western Europe still known as the 
European Community. In 2011, Azman discussed the deficit as having two distinct 
interpretations: too little democracy and over-shadowed democracy (Azman, 2011). Thus, 
“democratic deficit in the EU means the lack or discrepancy between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought 
to be’ in terms of democracy in the EU” (Azman, 2011). This deficit has led to various 
interpretations in European politics of exactly how European citizens react and perceive various 
governmental institutions. Some argue that since Europe is removed from daily life, citizens’ 
perceptions are viewed through the lens of their own government. Others say the EU is viewed 
as its own identity. Below follows a review of literature on democracy deficit and perceptions of 
institutions in the European Union. 
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
 While European leaders initiated policies that led to ever closer integration, “large parts 
of their publics remained stuck in the ‘old’ ways of thinking about the importance of old-
fashioned nation states” (Wilson, 2014). In other words, traditional notions of sovereignty and 
nationalism remained stubbornly fixed among large swaths of the public. The difference between 
public desires and government action is the democratic deficit. This deficit is shown in elections 
to the European Parliament (EP), the only directly elected institution within the greater European 
Union. Since 1979 the EP has been directly elected every five years by voters in member states, 
but even this modicum of electoral legitimacy may not have endowed the EU or the EP with 





representation that has failed to build effective links between the people and the Union” (Scully, 
Hix, & Farrell, 2012). In an enlightening study, Ezrow and Hellwig examine democratic 
responsiveness of national governments and the pressure applied on them from “outside” forces 
(like the International Monetary Fund) in decision-making processes by examining decision-
makers choices between their constituents and international market forces. They find “market 
dependence” does in fact negatively affect democracy and a party’s incentive to respond to 
public desires breaks down when that economy is not sufficiently sheltered from world markets. 
Importantly, they find that as “countries become more deeply integrated into world markets, 
party representatives appear less and less responsive to citizen preferences. Specifically … 
parties with governing experience in countries characterized by high levels of economic 
globalization do not respond in kind to inter-election shifts in the mean voter’s position in terms 
of left and right” (Ezrow & Hellwig, 2014). This fraying of traditional liberal democracy in 
globalized economies illustrates the democratic deficit and its effects on political legitimacy and 
stability. 
 Within the EU lies the Eurozone, the collection of states who share the euro as common 
currency (see above). The Eurozone has no centralized political authority as other currency zones 
do (such as the United States). Therefore the value of the euro cannot be changed by any one 
member state. This structural quirk erupted into prominence beginning in 2008 with the financial 
crisis and subsequent recession. While not all EU members use the euro, a significant number do 
(19 in fact), including the large economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The structural 
restrictions of the Eurozone (namely the inability for an individual state to devalue the currency, 
the standard operating procedure when faced with recession and unemployment) meant several 





Poor states like Greece suffered and quickly found difficulty financing their sovereign debt, 
putting the entire Eurozone at risk, including EU bulwark Germany.  As the magnitude of the 
problem grew and became clear, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and European 
Central Bank (an EU institution) negotiated bailout assistance to several countries, but with 
important caveats.  The indebted countries were required to implement deep austerity measures 
which included hiring freezes, tax increases and massive spending cuts (Lane, 2012).  To some, 
these measures made the recession worse and were undemocratically implemented by foreign 
powers onto separate sovereign nations.  These austere measures have also been severe and 
highly unpopular.  In June Greeks voted strongly against these measures in a referendum, only to 
have their creditors successfully impose them anyway, with government acquiescence. This has 
resulted in political instability and unrest, as anti-austerity political parties have gained in 
popularity, many of whom are outside the mainstream of traditional politics.  In Greece, a left 
wing government was elected with the promise of ending austerity measures perceived to have 
been imposed upon Greece by the EU. Blaming the European Union and traditional pro-
European parties is becoming common. 
 These strains can be seen in a 2013 study conducted in Spain, another country hit hard by 
austerity. This study was found political parties used the crisis to shift blame from themselves 
and onto the ethereal notion of “globalization,” in attempts to absolve themselves of blame for 
both the initial recession and the subsequent unpopular austerity measures (Fernandez-Albertos, 
Kuo, & Balcells, 2013). In addition, these authors found partisan bias to be a strong factor in 
policy preferences with regards to Europe and the economic crisis, especially if 
“…globalization-related explanations of the crisis are made salient” (Fernandez-Albertos, Kuo, 





integration and the European Union. The find the “incumbent party endorsement of globalization 
as a cause of the crisis affects the party’s supporters’ views of the crisis: They help exonerate the 
government, and blame other European governments more. This suggests that it is not difficult 
… to induce a specific subset of citizens to ‘scapegoat’ globalization in difficult economic times” 
(Fernandez-Albertos, Kuo, & Balcells, 2013). Thus, in an effort to survive, a domestic 
government (or traditional opposition) may overtly blame the integration and “outsiders” (i.e. the 
European Union) for their troubles and not the traditional political elites of the nation. 
 Additionally European policies during the euro crisis may have fed into the perception 
democracy deficit.  Because the European Union is 28 nations and involves complex institutions 
and interconnections, collective decisions are often the result of several convoluted and messy 
compromises amongst a myriad of competing and at times diametrically opposed interests. 
Finding common ground in the name of European unity is increasingly difficult and at times runs 
counter to a nation’s sovereignty and policy preference.  In fact “the EU was the one institution 
most likely to carry on as if nothing had happened” during the financial crisis (Wilson, 2014). As 
protests and disillusionment spread and new parties arose to take advantage, European politics 
has become more nationalistic and populist, two things the European Union is not and actively 
discourages (Wilson, 2014). 
 The European Union’s experiments with political integration was “…the result of a 
process of voluntary integration between the nation-states of Europe” (Hix & Hoyland, 2011) 
(emphasis added). It has evolved from six members to 28 and from coal and steel to a near total 
economic, social and political union (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). In the post-Cold War era, the EU 
has expanded beyond its Western and Southern European core to include the states of the former 





market and the largest economy in the world. Since 1992, the European Union has exemplified 
the notions behind integration. It involves: 
…the removal of internal barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and 
labour, a single European competition policy, and a single European currency (the euro). 
As a consequence of the single market, in 1990s the [EU] adopted common social and 
environmental policies, common policies on the movement of persons between the 
member states and across the EU’s external borders, and began to coordinate 
macroeconomic, justice and policing, and foreign and security policies. (Hix & Hoyland, 
2011) 
This rapid expansion and integration led to an economic boom after to adoption of the euro (and 
easy credit). But then followed by the financial crash of 2007-08 and the subsequent recession 
and crises in the Eurozone, creating two enormous shocks to the EU system (Scully, Hix, & 
Farrell, 2012). This strained the EU’s balance between democratic national governments and 
largely unelected European Union leaders. The EU political system is both decentralized and 
based on voluntary compliance from both member nation-states and their citizens. The 
administration of EU policies is left largely to the governments of the member states, even if 
those states disagree with the policy decided (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). This is resulting in yet 
another layer of the democracy deficit that threatens the unity and legitimacy of the entire 
European Union.  This deficit “…results from the fact that as the governments have delegated 
powers to the European level, policy-making in Brussels (the headquarters of the European 
Union administrative body) has become isolated from domestic public opinion and national 
parliaments, which has led to a degree of ‘policy drift’ away from the preferences of some 
notional European wide average citizen” (Hix & Hoyland, 2011) 
In short, the expansion of the EU and the economic crises of recent years have resulted in 





recent study of the political attitudes of MEP members from both old and new member states that 
showed “... MEP’s personal ideological preferences (left/right and pro-/anti-Europe) and which 
Member State they come from are more powerful predictors of their attitudes toward EU policies 
than their EP political group affiliation” (Scully, Hix, & Farrell, 2012). This study suggests that 
Members of the European Parliament view European issues via domestic concerns, and not 
necessarily in pan-European terms. Decisions are not made in the name of European unity but 
rather through a national lens. This has led to a situation where EU member states are both 
sovereign nations and deeply integrated members of a transnational government, creating a sense 
of confusion and ambivalence. The EU is “in reality, a mixture of post-modern factors and old 
nation-state traditions, reflected in the most complex constitutional and decision-making 
arrangements imaginable” (Wilson, 2014). 
INTEGRATION 
European Union integration shares some pillars in common with the concept of 
globalization. Defining what exactly is globalization is a question that has produced much 
debate. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy defines globalization as “…a process that 
encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration 
of human and non-human activities” (Al-Rodham & Stoudmann, 2006). Others see integration in 
ideological terms and use integration and globalization as a stand in for imperialism and define 
the phenomenon as “…the domination of developing countries by the overdeveloped ones, or of 
national and local economies by transnational corporations” (Axtmann, 1998).  Some indeed see 
integration as a threat to democracy. This anti-globalization philosophy can then be divided into 
three categories: 1) globalization as Americanization, 2) globalization as a capitalist strategy and 





globalization as Americanization, integration is seen as nothing more than an expansion of 
American economic and cultural hegemony at the expense of all else. In the second criticism, 
globalization is seen as capitalism run amok and threatening to de-rail important social progress 
made, especially in Western Europe. Finally, the third criticism argues more that the power and 
influence of national institutions are being weakened, giving greater power to international actors 
(such as multinational corporations), whether legal or criminal, that often lack democratic 
legitimacy (Von Bogdandy, 2004). In short, integration/globalization leads to a loss of national 
sovereignty, especially if there is a lack of accountability in government. 
 In contrast the view that increased integration aids prosperity, democracy and, of interest 
for Europe, democratization can be seen. Free trade is linked to prosperity which is linked to 
consolidated democracies. Any restrictions on freedom of action for a state are seen as positives, 
of limiting the scope for unreasonable decisions. Furthermore, being tied to a global economy 
can codify international laws designed to protect free trade and democracy. (Von Bogdandy, 
2004) A global market stretching beyond borders, it is argued, widens and deepens prosperity 
beyond levels of the nation-state. States within the European Union lack the freedom of 
movement of the traditional nation-state, by design as previously this freedom led to war and 
destruction. Where traditionally the “European understanding of the nation-state is based on the 
assumption of a fundamental congruence between a people integrated by strong economic, 
cultural and historic bonds and its state whose main task is to organize and develop this nation” 
(Von Bogdandy, 2004), now “most European countries have long ago ceased to be modern states 
provided with the complete toolkit of classical statecraft and the will for using it” (Wilson, 
2014). With integrated economies and multinational actors proliferating, this old standard of 





integration. Old bonds are fraying and democratic legitimacy is being affected. A process of “de-
nationalization” is occurring which manifests itself in various ways: an increase in migration 
outside one’s cultural sphere, national economies are more bound to the global economy than 
ever before, national cultures are part of a global entertainment system and an increase in non-
state actors like terrorist groups and criminal gangs (Von Bogdandy, 2004). 
THEORIES OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Two theories on Europeans’ perceptions of their national and super national institutions 
in the literature are of importance for this study: sui generis and transfer. Sui generis posits that 
European institutions are viewed as their own entity and judged as such, while transfer theory 
believes that citizens’ perception of European institutions is influenced by their perceptions of 
their national government. One study finds that while there is evidence suggesting the transfer 
theory, increasingly the EU is judged sui generis, making European elections more impactful 
that previously (Clark, 2009).  Clark and Rohrschneider (2009) write that as the EU becomes 
bigger and more powerful it is only natural that it begins impacting voter behavior since EU 
policies play in increasing and visible role in everyday life. More and more laws come from the 
European Union (Clark, 2009).  Since the end of the Cold War, Clark and Rohrschneider point 
out, the European Community evolved from a small, western European institution standing in 
contrast to a communist Eastern Europe into a European wide single market with a shared 
currency, labor force and even the beginning of an independent government in an elected 
European Parliament, which theoretically holds the European Commission accountable.  No 
longer is the “permissive consensus”
4
 of earlier days possible.  Therefore, “…citizens may 
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increasingly rely on their preferences about European integration per se, as well as their 
perceptions of the EU’s performance or that of national parties at the EU level, when they cast a 
ballot in EU elections or more generally judge the representation process at the EU level” (Clark, 
2009). In essence, what were once second order elections, European Parliamentary elections, are 
in fact rapidly becoming first order elections. Sui generis theory says domestic politics has little 
to no effect then on European elections. 
 One reason for the growing gap between the public and European institutions is Europe’s 
lack of salience as a domestic political issue.  Mainstream parties in European member nations 
rarely have made European wide issues a part of their national campaigns, despite the growing 
reach and power of the European government.  Green-Pedersen (2012) list two main reasons 
mainstream parties have preferred not to discuss European issues at home. “First, party positions 
on the issue deviate from the left-right dimension, which is the basic structure of party 
competition in Europe. … Second, voting behaviour with regard to European integration depends 
crucially on how the issue is framed and this makes the electoral impact of politicisation more 
unpredictable for mainstream parties …” and opening up political space for parties and actors 
previously outside the mainstream (Green-Pedersen, 2012). While European issues have been 
discussed in elections for the European Parliament, turnout is historically lower suggesting a low 
level of salience for the electorate.  Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) may also have 
different linkages to their constituents than traditional MPs.  A 2012 study of MEPs found that 
while new member nations (in Central and Eastern Europe) were ideologically more right wing 
than their older nation counterparts, there is now no significant divergence on general attitude 
toward the EU. They were surprised to find that “…MEPs’ personal ideological preferences 
                                                                                                                                                                                           






(left-right and pro-/anti-Europe) and which Member State they come from are more powerful 
predictors of their attitudes towards EU policies than their EP political group affiliation.” 
(Scully, Hix, & Farrell, 2012) This result is not consistent with previous studies, which showed 
membership in a political group (or party) more important. 
 This lack of European issue salience in national level politics is seen by some as transfer 
theory at work as citizens’ frustration or praise of their own governments and transfer them to 
European institutions.  National governments after all, rarely brought European issues into their 
domestic political discourse. In 2000,  Mair said “Europe becomes a matter for the governing 
politicians and their bureaucracies; it is not something that requires the active engagement of, or 
consultation with, the electorate at large” (Mair, 2000).  National parties failed to discuss Europe 
domestically due to internal divisions its lack of salience with a large number of national voters 
and the fact that European policies often and increasingly constrain a government’s policy 
options.  For instance, the EU often has the power to dictate policy to its member states, legally 
requiring national governments to implement them. Mair (2000) does note the potential for 
Europe to enter national politics, such as via direct democracy (referenda) or through non-
mainstream parties, but as of his writing it was limited. Furthermore, Mair notes the problems 
with the de-politicization of Europe. 
In the first place, European integration increasingly operates to constrain the freedom of 
movement of national governments, and hence encourages a hollowing out of 
competition among those parties with a governing aspiration. As such, it promotes a 
degree of consensus across the mainstream and an inevitable reduction in the range of 
policy alternatives available to voters. Second, by taking Europe itself out of national 
competition, and by working within a supranational structure that clearly lacks 
democratic accountability, party and political leaderships do little to counteract the notion 
of the irrelevance of conventional politics … In the end, therefore, it seems hardly 
coincidental that it is precisely during this period of deepening European integration that 





Party leaderships – and the party systems of which they are part – may well have proved 
capable of protecting themselves from the direct impact of Europeanisation. 
Nevertheless, by so doing, they may have risked undermining the legitimacy of their 
calling (Mair, 2000, pp. 48-49). 
Adam and Maier find a similar disconnect. They studied the campaigns of European parties in 
the 2009 European Parliament elections in six selected countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) to see if European or national issues 
were highlighted. Their main hypothesis was if national issues were the focus, then the transfer 
theory applies. “We show that the majority of national parties in six European countries feature 
EU actors (and not national ones) as their main campaign message transmitter” (Adam, 2011). In 
low turnout elections to an unpopular institution, domestic political leaders were hesitant to enter 
the campaign, leaving it to “second order” European politicians. Maier, Adam and transfer 
theorists argue that election campaigns to the European Parliament are secondary to domestic 
campaigns and are highly subject to being influenced by domestic political conditions. 
 The EU did not fail to notice its democratic deficit. In the 2014 European Parliamentary 
elections, a new system was instituted with the Spitzenkandidaten.  Before 2014 the EP had only 
the power to approve the appointment of the European Commission (the administrative body), 
including its president. The Commission had been nominated by the Council of Europe, the 
assemblage of member-states’ heads of government, since its founding.  In 2014 though each of 
the EP’s political groups, or parties, competing for seats in the European Parliament would 
nominate a single individual, a Spitzenkandidaten, to serve as that party’s nominee for European 
Commission president. The idea for a single face of the party to campaign for the party was 
intended to make the EP election more familiar, more first order. The winner of a majority (or 





This effort to democratize and empower the EU’s sole directly elected body ran into some 
problems.  Democracy meant different things to different people. The UK and Hungary felt the 
European Union was growing too powerful and invasive and was harming internal domestic 
democracy and their sovereignty.  The rest of the EU felt voters’ choice of the center-right 
European People’s Party as the largest party entitled their candidate to the presidency. In the end, 
the UK and Hungary were outvoted. If elites fail to agree on the definition of democracy it’s 
much more difficult for them to be responsive to the electorate (Hobolt, 2014).  Hobolt’s study 
(as well as the broad general election results from the entire Europe) suggests the breakdown of 
legitimacy is far from universal throughout Europe. Not only does the region matter, but country 
and region of the country matter as well. 
 Whether or not Europeans view the European Union through the lens of their own 
government or as an entity onto its own is still a hotly debated and contested throughout Europe.  
Mair’s conclusions were published in 2000, in the very early days of the Eurozone. Adam and 
Maier’s findings may well have been different if they had expanded their study beyond the six 
nations selected. Hobolt is writing of very recent events which may not have fully played out.  
Furthermore, the Euro crisis and the sovereign debt crises (as seen in the various Greek 
negotiations) have shaken Europe to its core.  While there was agreement that national political 
elites are very hesitant to discuss European integration with an increasingly skeptical and even 
hostile public, studies tracking the public’s views of both their national government and the 
European Union has been few and far between.  This study seeks to fill that gap using publically 
available Eurobarometer data to examine how each member nation’s views of their national 





 Euro-scepticism, often coupled with anti-integration and anti-immigrant rhetoric, is 
seemingly rising in Europe and much of the literature focuses on its origins in the EU’s 
democracy deficit as well as the recession and subsequent Eurozone and sovereign debt crises. 
But as EU member nations move toward more integration, in some cases without consulting the 
electorate, there is little study on the impact of this growing divide and the possibility this 
potential illegitimacy could derail more than just integration. The literature agrees that the elites 
of the EU and its member nations and their electorate are not on the same page: political elites 
knew their positions are unpopular and therefore decline to make campaign issues out of these 
policies and therefore leave the positive aspects undefended. This can open up space for parties 
that use these issues as a wedge to gain votes and are anti-establishment, potentially radically so. 
The results have been a rise in strongly Euro-sceptic parties, such as the aforementioned Jobbik 
in Hungary. Using a comparative case study and some descriptive statistics this study will 
attempt to examine the extent, if it exists, of the erosion of tradition political legitimacy of the 













 For this examination I tested how European citizens’ perceptions of their government 
institutions are formed. For instance, does a citizen feel negatively toward pan-European 
institutions if he or she is opposed to their national government? Or does their perception of EU 
institutions affect their view of their government? This section will describe how I attempted to 
answer this question. Furthermore, I took two prominent theories on European citizens’ 
relationship with their various governments (transfer and sui generis) and tested their validity, 
using methods listed below. 
SELECTION 
 I used available Eurobarometer data to test the hypothesis. Eurobarometer data is usually 
a biannual survey of European Union citizens conducted on behalf of the European Commission, 
the EU institution that serves as the bureaucracy. It has been conducted since 1973 and has 
consistently asked a number of relevant questions to European citizens over a long period of 
time. I selected two survey questions and measured them over a ten year period, starting in 
October 2004 and ending in May 2014. This time frame is useful as it covers a time of prosperity 
and rapid EU expansion in 2004 and through recession and the Eurozone crisis of the last few 
years. The survey questions I used measure the level of trust in the national government and in 
the European Union itself. They are: 
1) Do you tend to trust or not to trust your national government, 
2) Do you tend to trust the European Union. 
Each survey consists of about 1,000 face-to-face interviews (with some exceptions for smaller 





proportionally sampled and listed as the UK so as not to skew results toward any one region). 
The surveys are conducted between 2 and 5 times yearly, with the reports being made available 
twice a year, usually in the spring and winter. The data will was evaluated primarily as a 
comparative case study and examined all 28 member nations as well as the EU as a whole. By 
presenting the data in charts, we can see the gaps in trust between the national government and 
the EU. The larger the gap between the two, the stronger the case for sui generis will be. The 
results will show that not all member states have equivalent levels of trust, suggesting other 
factors at play, at least in some countries. Each of the selected survey questions for each nation 
















RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
Theory 
 There exists in the European Union a growing distance between policy elites and the 
general populace. As austerity and unemployment lead to an upending of politics as usual, 
seemingly aloof and far away people and institutions provide solutions that seem 
counterproductive at best.  What explains this growing divide and its potential for nearly 
unprecedented political instability in the 28 nations of the EU?  While a democratic deficit is 
present in Europe it is not the only factor. By examining the levels in trust citizens have in their 
national government and in the European Union itself, a gap between these levels of trust will be 
seen. Some countries, naturally, have larger gaps in trust than others. The larger the gap, the 
larger sui generis theory is applicable. Likewise, the smaller the gap the more transfer theory can 
be inferred.  
 In the wake of the economic crisis, Euro-skepticism has seemingly risen. However this 
appears to not be the case in Central and Eastern Europe, member-nations that share a recent 
history of authoritarian Communist governments. These countries seem to turn to the EU rather 
than their own governments, seemingly more comfortable with the older EU institutions rather 
than their own newer and unconsolidated democracies. As time passes, these countries may 
match their older EU brethren in Euro-skepticism, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
This rest of this paper examines the following hypothesis: 
H1: There exists a gap between member-states’ citizens professed trust in their national 
government and in the European Union as a whole over the time of this study. The greater this 





earlier members concentrated primarily in the West and North, will show less of a gap and a 
decrease in trust after the financial crisis began in 2008, while “new” Europe in the Center and 
Eastern part of the continent will show a wider gap, with trust in the EU being higher than trust 
in their own national governments. 
By studying the gap over a ten year time period covering the excitement of mass 
expansion through the great financial crises of the last half decade allows examination of public 
opinion independently. Where transfer theory applies the gap will be small; sui generis in 
contrast will have a higher gap. This timeframe also allows for the study of the financial crisis 
















The following charts show the measured levels of trust of selected nations to the 
Eurobarometer polls. Again, the two questions being measured are 1) do you tend to trust or not 
to trust your national government, and 2) do you tend to trust the European Union? The 
questions are chosen as a good indication of faith, and therefore the legitimacy, of both national 
governments and European institutions. The time frame is from October 2004 until May 2014. 
The countries displayed are chosen to test both hypotheses. Charts were created for all 28 
member states but only a few are listed. 
 Chart 1 begins with government trust levels in Belgium, a founder state of what would 
become the European Union in the aftermath of World War II. Belgium is a longstanding 
democracy and open market, but suffers from intense language-based political fractionalization. 
Its position in the center of the old European Community also allows it to be the host to a 
number of EU institutions. In addition, Belgium is a member of the Eurozone. 
























































































































The Belgian example shows a rich, Western European, founding member of the EU’s 
levels of trust in both their government and the EU. At the beginning of this timeframe Belgian 
citizens in fact trusted the EU more than their own, fractious national government, even in the 
early days of the financial crash 2009 and 2010. Beginning in 2011 however we see a 
convergence of the gap between levels of trust. H1 states that older states in Europe are more 
transfer theory. The data suggests that this is true after the debt crisis began in earnest. 
Chart 2 offers additional evidence for the hypothesis. In it we see the trust levels for the 
island nation of Cyprus, which ascended to EU membership in the 2004 mass enlargement.  
While not a former Communist state, it has suffered from political instability due to the presence 
of a breakaway Turkish-backed separatist republic in the north of the country and the long-
stalled peace talks between the sides.  This did not halt Cypriot accession into both the EU and 
the Eurozone.  In addition, Cyprus has been badly harmed by the debt crises and economic 
recession and was the recipient of a large bailout package from international creditors in 2013.   
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The gap in Cypriot levels of trust in both levels of government is small and both levels 
plunge starting in 2008, right as the financial crisis struck. H1 applies here. Chart 3 shows 
Greece, which ascended into the EU in the early 1980s following the return of democracy after a 
short, but brutal, military dictatorship. While never subject to Communist rule, Greece did suffer 
through a brutal and divisive civil war between communists and non-communists following 
World War II. Greece is also a member of the Eurozone. Greece, of course, has been 
newsworthy of late for the controversy over negotiations for its third bailout package from 
international creditors and the European Central Bank, dominated by Germany.  In this case we 
see stronger trust in the EU over the national government with a fairly consistent gap between 
the levels of trust. In addition Greece has been badly hurt by the economic crisis and this plays 
out in the sharp fall in trust levels once the crisis began in 2009 and 2010. This relatively 
consistent gap indicates Greece to be more sui generis than its older EU counterparts, but still 
suggests the recession has hurt trust levels. The gap however exists. 




















































































































 Now the attention is focused on Germany, the economic heart of the EU. Germany is the 
largest economy in the EU, a member of the Eurozone and politically the most powerful state. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has, for better or worse, become the face and driving force of 
Europe and EU policies. Since reunification in 1990, democracy and capitalism have been well 
established. 
Chart 4: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Germany 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Here we see an expected pattern, at least at first. The gap in German trust levels at the beginning 
of this study’s timeframe show a mild gap that closed in the year before the economic crisis 
erupted and prosperity seemed to abound in Europe. During the beginning of the crisis the gap 
basically closed and recently has seen trust in national government overtake trust in the EU, 
creating the reverse of the gap seen at the beginning of the study (though importantly both levels 
of trust rarely top 50 percent). The crisis seems to have had an effect on whether sui generis or 
transfer theory apply to Germany. Pre-crisis a small gap existed in favor of the EU, implying 


















































































































 In the previous examples we see the effect of the economic crisis on trust levels. In the 
case of Belgium, wherein a gap existed before the crisis, afterwards trust levels converged. In 
Cyprus virtually no gap is present even as trust levels fall in the wake of the crisis. Greece sees a 
gap that stays consistent through the crisis as trust levels again fall. Finally in Germany, a small 
gap exists in favor of the EU before the crisis, evaporates during the early days of the crisis and 
has reversed itself in a small gap favoring the national government in the most recent surveys. To 
review, this paper’s hypothesis states that a gap exists between levels of trust and was 
exacerbated by the economic crisis. The bigger the gap, the more evidence of sui generis theory 
is seen. Some EU countries show larger gaps than others; for instance, in the former Communist 
bloc. In 2004 the European Union had its greatest expansion, bringing in several nations of the 
former Communist bloc (including actual former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
and nearly doubling in size. Ten nations in all joined the EU, largely former Communist bloc 
nations transitioning to democratic capitalism. Part of the logic behind this expansion was the 
stabilization of democracy and capitalism, as both were new to many of these nations. Therefore 
it is hypothesized in these nations support for the stabilizing forces of the EU will outpace that of 
their new, unstable and often corrupt governments. This study’s hypothesis believes they will 
possess a wider sui generis gap than their older counterparts. 
 Starting in Chart 5, selected former Communist nations are shown with their trust in 
national governments and trust in the EU, starting with Bulgaria, which ascended to the 







Chart 5: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Bulgaria 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Bulgaria, like its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, had a Communist government 
after World War II, only coming to democracy and capitalism in the early 1990s. Both before 
and after ascension Bulgarians had a higher level of trust in the EU than in their own national 
government.  A wide gap exists between the levels of trust Bulgarians have for the EU and their 
national government, with the EU being consistently more trusted. In addition the economic 
crisis seems to have little effect on these levels.  
 Among the biggest and most enthusiastic EU proponents in the former Communist bloc 
was Poland, shown in Chart 6. Poland was among the leaders in overthrowing Communist rule 
and sought EU membership enthusiastically, though it has since cooled on joining the Eurozone. 
























































































































Chart 6: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Poland 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
 A large gap between levels of trust exists early in the timeframe and closes somewhat as 
the economic crisis unfolded. This fits the hypothesis. 
 Another state that ascended in the mass expansion of 2004-5 was Estonia. Not only was 
Estonia a former Communist state, Estonia is a former constituent part of the USSR until 
independence in 1991. Unlike Bulgaria and Poland, Estonia is a member of the Eurozone. In 
Estonia there is a small and minimal gap between levels of trust, with the exception a sharp dip 
in trust in May 2009 for the national government, which was at the beginnings of the financial 
crisis. Nevertheless, Estonia does not fit neatly into the hypothesis that a sui generis-based gap 
exists and is more prevalent in the newer, formerly Communist member-states. Chart 7 below 


























































































































Chart 7: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Estonia 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
 An entirely different case is seen in Latvia, Estonia’s fellow former Soviet republic. Here 
a large gap exists that narrows somewhat in recent years of the crisis (once again note the lack of 
trust passing the 50 percent mark).  In addition Latvia implemented European-initiated austerity 
measures similar to Greece in 2010-11, with much less political drama. 







































































































































































































































 Only Estonia, Germany and Cyprus see little to no gap in levels of trust. Belgium began 
the timeframe of the study with a small gap, but once the crisis unfolded that gap disappeared. 
Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland and Latvia show consistent and large gaps. H1 anticipated 
sui generis to be more prevalent in “newer” Europe, meaning a large gap in trust levels, with 
smaller gaps in “old” Europe. The following sections attempt to briefly account for these 
unexpected challenges to the hypothesis. However, due to time and the limited scope of this 
paper, deeper analysis will need to be done. 
  
INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIT 
 The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe challenge the stereotype of growing 
Euro-skepticism in EU member nations, as their levels of trust in the EU exceed those of their 
national government, at least for now. In addition, these nations have larger gaps in their trust 
levels between national and transnational governments, even in light of the financial crisis. This 
suggests strong sui generis theory. An explanation for the discrepancy between the regions of the 
European Union might be explained by a sub hypothesis: nations with a recent history of 
authoritarian political control and a state centered economy (i.e. the former Communist nations 
of Central and Eastern Europe) lack fully consolidated and transparent democracies that have not 
yet fully earned democratic legitimacy from their populace, while the older and more established 
European Union is viewed as more stable, less corrupt and possessing more opportunity than the 
new national regimes. This institutional deficit then may explain why the hypothesis does not 





 To test this sub hypothesis, corruption scores from Transparency International (a global 
anti-corruption NGO) are measured from the EU members listed above. Transparency 
International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” 
(International). Yearly Transparency International releases a corruption perception index, which 
allows the comparison over time of the public’s perceptions of corruption in that country. A 
score of 0 is highly corrupt, while a score of 100 is a highly clean system. Table 1 below lists the 
EU countries listed above. 
Table 1: EU corruption perception index by 2014 score 
COUNTRY 2014 Score Rank out of all nations 
Germany 79 12/174 
Belgium 76 15/174 
Estonia 69 26/174 
Cyprus 63 31/174 
Poland 61 35/174 
Latvia 55 43-174 
Bulgaria 43 69/174 
Greece 43 69/174 
Source: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results 
This list is topped by Germany, Belgium, Estonia and Cyprus with Poland just behind the 
Cypriots. Founding members Germany and Belgium possess high levels of belief in their 
cleanliness of their governments and see little gap in their levels of trust (though Belgium’s gap 
was virtually eliminated and Germany’s grew in favor of the national government during the 
economic crisis), as the hypothesis expects. Estonia, Cyprus, Poland and Latvia (three of whom 
are former Communist nations with a predicted institutional deficit) sit fairly close to each other 
in the middle of the pack with Bulgaria and Greece relatively far behind their brethren. The 
hypothesis predicts that newer member-nations with a recent history of Communist domination 





this out, Estonia’s relatively small gap coupled with Greece’s gap complicate matters. Table 1 
attempts to explain via corruption perception indices possibly why Greece and Estonia differ 
from the hypothetical expectations. Greece’s high level of perceived corruption puts it closer in 
line with other Balkan members, while Estonia’s is more moderate. Corruption seems to play at 
least some factor trusting the EU over a new, unstable national government (such as in Bulgaria).  
Another factor is the economic crisis. Briefly follows trust levels in bigger countries hit 
hard by the economic crisis, many of which have been forced to implement austerity programs 
by the member-states less affected. Charts 9 through 12 depict France, Rep. of Ireland, Italy and 
Spain (nations hit by austerity or the threat of austerity). Charts 13-16 show economically 
stronger countries such as Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All but the 
UK are members of the Eurozone. In addition the UK’s Conservative-led government 
implemented some austerity measures on its own. Here are the results: 



















































































































France’s trust levels fluctuate and usually have a gap, indicating sui generis, despite France’s 
position as the second biggest economy in the Eurozone and historically the principal proponents 
of a united Europe. Chart 10 shows the Republic of Ireland, very badly hit in 2010’s crisis. 
Chart 10: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Rep. of Ireland 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Again, we see a continuous gap, with the exception if May 2011. As the crisis abated by 2012 
Irish levels of trust seemed to return to close to their pre-crisis levels. Ireland ascended to the EU 
in the 1970s and has an established democracy. Seeing sui generis this much is contrary to the 
hypothesis’ expectations, if the financial crisis is not taken into account. Next is Italy, shown 
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Chart 11: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Italy 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Italy also has seen economic difficulties during the last few years of the financial crisis, but still 
possesses a consistent gap in levels of trust, even as faith in the EU has fallen. Italy is a founding 
member of the EU and the Eurozone, therefore expected to show small gaps, if at all, according 
to the hypothesis. Chart 12 shows another austerity nation; Spain. 

































































































































































































































Spain joined the EU in the early 1980s after completing the transition to democracy from the 
Franco years and is a member of the Eurozone. A relatively small but consistent gap exists. The 
crisis in Spain has seen an erosion of trust in both the national government and the EU. 
 Finally, next this study briefly looks at the stronger, creditor nations of the EU (having 
already examined Germany). First is Chart 13 and Finland. 
Chart 13: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Finland 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Finland is a newer member of the EU, but has a small gap that has closed somewhat during the 
crisis. Furthermore, trust in the Finnish government is slightly higher than the EU. In recent 
negotiations with Greece for a third bailout, Finland has been a supporter of Germany’s hardline 
tactics. Next is Chart 14 and the Netherlands. The Dutch nation is small, but possesses a strong 





















































































































Chart 14: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in Netherlands 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
The Netherlands follows what the hypothesis expects: virtually no gap exists between trust in the 
national government and the EU. Next is Sweden, which joined in 1995 (alongside Finland) and 
is not in the Eurozone. 
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Sweden shows little gap until the economic crisis hits, at which point faith in their own 
government begins to exceed that in the EU. Finally, the United Kingdom is examined. The UK 
has a consistent Euro-skeptic streak. The third largest vote getter in this year’s general election 
with the strongly Euro-skeptic United Kingdom Independence Party. The UK joined in the 1970s 
(after French opposition was dropped) and is not a member of the Eurozone. 
Chart 16: Levels of trust for national and EU institutions in United Kingdom 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
The UK shows a low level of trust in BOTH governments but the gap is consistently small. 
 In conclusion, the hypothesis states there will be a gap between levels of trust in the 
national government of a member-state and the larger EU (indicating sui generis. The larger the 
gap, the more sui generis that country is). This will be especially true for the newer states with a 
recent history Communist authoritarianism, largely due to perceptions of corruption in their new 
regimes. Older European members will possess smaller gaps. The initial data did not fully back 
up the hypothesis. A further test was done on levels of perceived corruption. Well partially 



















































































































incompleteness of the hypothesis is seen. Countries examined with small gaps (hypothesized to 
be older EU members) were: 




E) Germany before the crisis, 
F) Netherlands, 
G) Sweden before the crisis and 
H) United Kingdom. 
Countries with relatively large gaps included: 
A) Bulgaria, 
B) France,  
C) Greece, 
D) Rep. of Ireland, 
E) Italy, 
F) Latvia, 
G) Poland and 
H) Spain. 
In the first group, only Estonia and Cyprus don’t fit the hypothesis. Both countries though enjoy 
high levels of perceived cleanliness in their government. The second group, which contains the 





hypothesized to be more in line with their older European counterparts. Corruption is one factor, 
especially in Greece, that may be contributing to this gap. Another could be the economic crisis. 
All of these countries have been hit hard by the crisis, while those in the first group have fared 
relatively well, are creditor nations in the Eurozone or are outside the Eurozone entirely and thus 
aren’t faced with the same contagion effect should the Eurozone collapse. In short corruption, 
Eurozone membership and austerity in the economic crisis appear to play important factors in 
how sui generis a countries outlook has become in the financial crisis. 
 Further study is needed, especially to investigate the newer members of the Union. If 
these newer members possess more faith in the EU than their own national governments due to 
corruption and implications from the financial crisis, it is possible their trust levels will change as 
they further integrate with Europe. Meaning it is possible their trust gaps will reverse and 
resemble their older counterparts in northwestern Europe as they further integrate and stabilize; 
or they will stay similar to their current levels. In addition further study is needed on the causes 













 This study tests the hypothesis to answer the research question as to how European Union 
citizens perceive their governments and institutions; specifically whether Europeans judge the 
European Union on its own merits (sui generis theory) or through the lens of their national 
government (transfer theory). Mair identified the differences between first and second order 
elections as evidence of transfer theory at work. Sui generis theorists believe citizens judge each 
by its own merits, as Clark and Rohrschneider (2009) show. Utilizing two simple Eurobarometer 
questions regarding faith and trust in national and EU governments in each member nation, I was 
able test to determine if a gap existed in levels of trust. The larger the gap, the more sui generis 
theory was applicable in that country. By entering the survey questions into graphs, it was 
possible to observe public support for both national and European governments’ side-by-side and 
over time. 
 The evidence presented a mix. Some states showed little to no gap, such as Germany, the 
Netherlands and Cyprus. Belgium’s gap disappeared as the financial crisis unfolded. Some other 
states showed small gaps, primarily in the north and west of Europe. Larger gaps were seen in 
Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, France, Italy and Spain (among others). An institutional gap was 
tested. Using the Transparency International corruption perception index, several former 
Communist nations were seen to have higher levels of perceived corruption, possibly resulting in 
these nations’ higher levels of sui generis gaps than their older counterparts. Approximately 100 
million people, a third of the EU’s population, are estimated to reside in these former Communist 
countries that favor the EU. This explanation, though, was not completely satisfactory as some 
non-Communist states also possessed high levels of sui generis. More explanatory was the 





suffering via the financial crisis and subsequent unpopular austerity measures seemed to have 
higher levels of sui generis. This suggests a connection. The notable exception to this rule is 
Cyprus, which features a nearly negligible gap in trust levels. More research is needed. 
 This study suggests that Europe the European Union is far more complex than the simple 
paradigm of unelected elites imposing unpopular policies on a pliant and helpless public. The EU 
is a diverse and rich mosaic of political, cultural and economic cultures and nations. While 
undoubtedly the EU and policies seen as emanating from unelected bureaucrats from within the 
EU are unpopular in large segments of the public, the demonstrated trust deficit does not 
necessarily extend throughout the entirety of the continent. Mair and others note that European 
issues have largely been absent in domestic political elections, but there is evidence this is 
changing, possibly forcing the EU into a more democratic, accountable direction. The addition of 
Spitzenkandidaten is an indicator the European issues are gaining more salience, which may 
improve the chances of democratizing the EU. Euro-skeptic parties are entering the mainstream 
in places like the UK, where UKIP, while performing poorly in terms of seats, was the third 
largest vote getter in the UK general election. The reelected British government has promised an 
in or out referendum for the UK soon. All of these show European issues are entering the 
domestic mainstream, albeit in potentially unforeseen ways with unforeseen consequences on 
Europe. However it also presents the opportunity for policy-makers to incorporate Euro-skeptic 
parties in a peaceful, democratic way as well as reform the EU for the better, with increased 
accountability. 
Rising Euro-skepticism and anti-EU fringe parties entering the mainstream is not the 
complete story. Findings indicate Central and East Europe value the EU more than the rest of the 





(though as these nations are integrated into Western Europe the possibility exists for the trust 
deficit to reverse and imitate the old European members). For instance the Baltic countries 
(Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) have supported the sometimes unpopular German hardline on 
Greek debt relief negotiations. Hungary is building a border fence to keep out migrant workers. 
Numerous other cases of difficulty to reach a consensus agreement on policy include aggressive 
Russian expansion, migrants and refugees fleeing from the Middle East and future institutional 
reforms being pushed by the UK and others. It is possible the size and scope of the EU, in 
addition to the rapid and sizable accession of the Central and Eastern European countries with 
different political, social and economic histories, has made reaching a viable consensus more 
difficult. This in turn may result in policies too diluted to be of use in such a large, complex 
union. The result could then be profound frustration at the lack of efficiency and efficacy of 
European institutions, leading to more skepticism and a loss of trust. In addition, the growing 
public ennui in democratic and pluralistic societies in the West can further drive negative 
perceptions of Europe and institutions (but not necessarily of the policy-makers or the 
institutions themselves). Of interest for the future of the EU will be a possible United Kingdom 
referendum on leaving the EU, new elections in Greece and a possible bid for independence from 
Catalonia. Successful resolutions of these issues could greatly enhance the stability and 
legitimacy of the Shuman’s European project. Furthermore, increased tension with Russia in the 
Ukraine crisis may inspire the EU to reduce dependence on Russian oil and recommit to NATO 
and a more united foreign and security policy. In short, this study suggests that the European 
Union and its politics are far more complex than the simple narratives seemingly emerging from 
European coverage and study: specifically in the difference perceptions between “old” Europe 





The problems of the Eurozone are now exposed to the world and the rise of outside-the-
mainstream parties to challenge (and possibly reinvigorate) mainstream politics may shake the 
EU out of its austerity-obsessed myopia and make the proper reforms that grow economies and 
provide a growth in wages and jobs, allowing for stability. In addition, anti-immigration anti-
European parties rise in domestic elections may force mainstream parties to deal with these 
unpleasant and controversial issues and come to a more moderate resolution, in order to survive 
their challenge from more extremist parties. By forcing mainstream parties to deal with European 
issues, despite the risks, they may finally manage them and the extreme anti-EU parties would be 
weakened. The proper reforms may be enacted, and not knee-jerk, nationalistic and xenophobic 
policies advocated by some. The EU can survive and thrive and better promote its post-modern 
mission to provide security through internationalism and integration. It can prove democracy and 
capitalism can handle the rigors of an increasingly stateless world without sacrificing stability, 
prosperity, security, liberalism and respect for civil rights. The alternative is to fall into 
nationalistic and xenophobic discourse and atrophy, risking the entire European experiment for 
the political expediencies of the now.  
 It should be noted that this paper is suggestive and limited. Some correlation is seen 
between levels of trust in national government and levels of trust in the EU in several cases, but 
correlation is not causation. Further study is needed in this area, as well as in the emerging 
differences between “old” North and West Europe and “new” Central and East Europe. 
Additional study relevant to this paper would be in the nature of democracies in the West; 
meaning older, more established member-states seem to have a greater ennui towards Europe, 





frustrated with the compromises inherent in a pluralistic system, causing some of the trust and 
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Appendix A: Charts for all 28 European Union Member-States 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Republic of Cyprus Tend to trust national government
















































































































Czech Republic Tend to trust national government



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rep. of Ireland 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Luxembourg Tend to trust national government











































































































































































































































Netherlands Tend to trust national government
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